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JURISDICTION 
The Appellate Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 
78-2a-3(2)(b) and (j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND 
CORRESPONDING STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The main issue before the Appellate Court is whether the Utah County Board of 
Adjustment (hereinafter referred to as "Board") erred in denying South Eagle Ranches 
L.L.C.'s (hereinafter referred to as "South Eagle") request to overturn the decision of the 
Utah County Commission (hereinafter referred to as "County Commission") denying the 
South Eagle's Application for Agricultural Waiver of Subdivision Plat Filing 
Requirements (hereinafter referred to as "Application")? Specifically, this issue is 
divided into the following sub-issues: 
1. Whether the Board erred in denying South Eagle's request to overturn the decision 
of the County Commission denying the South Eagle's Application because the 
County Commission relied on the definition of 'land in agricultural use' as defined 
in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-502(4) rather than the requirements of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-2-503 to determine whether the lots or parcels resulting from the division of 
agricultural land qualified as land in agricultural use under Title 59, Chapter 2, 
Part 5 Farmland Assessment Act? The standard of review for this issue is 
correctness, but some level of non-binding deference is afforded to the 
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interpretation advanced by the local agency. See Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 
2004 UT 98,1f28, 513 Utah Adv. Rep. 23. 
2. Whether the Board's decision denying South Eagle's request to overturn the 
decision of the County Commission denying the South Eagle's Application was 
supported by substantial evidence in the record and therefore not arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal? The standard of review for this issue is arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal. If there is substantial evidence in the record to support the 
Board's decision, then the decision of the Board must be affirmed. See Patterson 
v. Utah Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. ORDINANCES, RULES AND DECISIONS 
The following are the controlling statutes, ordinances, rules and decisions: 
Statutes 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-806 
2. Utah Code Ann. §59-2-502(4) 
Ordinances 
3. Utah County Zoning Ordinance §3-53-B Addendum 
Rules of Evidence 
4. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 101 
5. Utah Rules of Evidence, 801 (d)(2) 
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Decisions 
1. Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 
2. Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98,513 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This matter comes before the Appellate Court for a review of the Board's decision 
denying South Eagle's request to overturn the decision of the County Commission 
denying the South Eagle's Application for Agricultural Waiver of Subdivision Plat Filing 
Requirements. 
Proceedings Below 
On August 2,2002, South Eagle filed an Application for Agricultural Waiver of 
Subdivision Plat Filing Requirements with the Utah County Community Development 
Department. (R. at 301). On November 19,2002, the Planning Commission failed to 
approve a motion to recommend approval of South Eagle's Application to the County 
Commission. Chairperson Steve White then requested that South Eagle's Application 
move on to the County Commission with a recommendation for disapproval. (R. at 73). 
On December 10,2002, the County Commission voted to deny South Eagle's Application 
based upon specific findings. (R. at 86-87). South Eagle then timely appealed to the 
Board. On March 6,2003, the Board considered South Eagle's Application for Alleged 
Error and voted to deny it based upon specific findings. (R. at 330-331, 341 at 57-60). 
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South Eagle then timely appealed to the District Court. The Honorable Gary D. Stott 
considered cross-motions for summary judgement and granted Appellees' Cross-motion 
for Summary Judgment and denied South Eagle's Motion for Summary Judgement. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 2,2002, South Eagle filed an Application for Agricultural Waiver of 
Subdivision Plat Filing Requirements with the Utah County Community Development 
Department. (R. at 301). Attached to the Application was a Record of Survey Map 
depicting the resulting parcels ranging in area from 5.5 acres to 8 acres. This Record of 
Survey Map also contained the following disclaimer that "a 5 acre lot in a non-irrigated 
area, such as the subject land, may not qualify for the value of agricultural production 
established by state law to obtain greenbelt designation under the Farmland Assessment 
Act." (R. at 289,295-296). 
On August 20,2002, the Planning Commission voted to recommend denial of 
South Eagle's Application for the following reasons: "(1) It appears likely that all the 
subsequent parcels will not be able to meet the Farmland Assessment Act requirements 
based on size; and (2) That it appears that the resulting parcels will not be able to meet the 
Farm (sic) Assessment Act requirements based on production." (R. at 42). 
On September 3,2002, the County Commission discussed the South Eagle's 
Application in Work Session and referred it to their September 10, 2002 meeting for 
decision. During this Work Session, "Fred Smith [the former owner of the property] 
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noted the subdivision was denied by the Planning Commission for the following reasons: 
1) After the road was installed the lots were less than five acres; they want to amend the 
lot size to meeting the requirements. 2) The dollar yield would not meet the 
requirements." Also, during the Work Session, County Commissioner Jerry Grover 
"noted that almost everyone at the Ranches [another agricultural subdivision in Utah 
County] did lose their Greenbelt status and there is a continuing problem with Bayview 
[another agricultural subdivision in Utah County] where they were told they could build 
in an agricultural subdivision." (R. at 58). 
On September 10, 2002, the County Commission considered South Eagle's 
Application and voted to refer it back to the Planning Commission at the request of Jason 
Ivins [representative of South Eagle] since South Eagle "re-submitted a revised survey 
map and plat to the Planning Commission, which increases the size of the lots." (R. at 
60). 
On September 17,2002, the Planning Commission voted to continue South Eagle's 
Application to their October 15,2002 meeting at the request of South Eagle. (R. at 61). 
On October 15,2002, the Planning Commission voted to continue South Eagle's to 
their November 19,2002 meeting. During this meeting the following verbal exchange 
took place: 
Dave Shawcroft [Deputy County Attorney] questioned whether the property 
qualifies as an agricultural subdivision. He felt the use was unclear for the 
foreseeable future. 
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Bill Ferguson [Planning Commissioner] noted that the applicant would not 
qualify for grazing on a 5-acre lot. 
Jason Ivins [representative of South Eagle L.C.] stated that Barbara Gordon 
[Utah County Assessor's Office] said the land is currently in a classification 
four. Grazing four requires 1.1 cow for 2 months out of the year of five 
acres to keep the land in greenbelt. 
Bill Ferguson [Planning Commissioner] claimed the land would not support 
that right now. 
Jason Ivins [representative of South Eagle] stated it may not right now but 
that is why the greenbelt doesn't require it. 
(R.at66). 
On November 19,2002, the Planning Commission failed to approve a motion to 
recommend approval of South Eagle's Application to the County Commission. 
Chairperson Steve White then requested that South Eagle's Application move on to the 
County Commission with a recommendation for disapproval. During this meeting, Dean 
Miner [Planning Commissioner] "felt that because of the lack of water to this parcel, the 
farming expectation was highly unreasonable, noting that the area is historically dry." (R. 
at 73-74). 
On November 26,2002, the County Commission discussed South Eagle's 
Application in Work Session. During this Work Session, County Commissioner Gary 
Herbert said "he would want to see evidence of water and the ability to have water to 
each of the lots in order to justify the agricultural purpose." (R. at 77). During this Work 
Session, County Commissioner Jerry Grover said "the implication is that each lot has got 
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to have water rights associated with it. A dry farm can't exist on five-acre lots." (R. at 
77). 
During this Work Session, Jason Ivins [representative of South Eagle] said "the 
most common usage is people putting up a corral and putting horses on it." County 
Commissioner Jerry Grover also "asked if there are roads constructed to each lot." Jason 
Ivins [representative of South Eagle] responded by saying "they're not constructed yet, 
but nobody would want to buy one before a road is constructed. They haven't attempted 
to market a parcel prior to construction of a road." (R. at 77). 
Also during this Work Session the following verbal exchange took place: 
Mr. [Jason] Ivins [representative of South Eagle L.C.] said Greenbelt has a 
low threshold and dry farming wouldn't work, but mere grazing would. 
[County] Commissioner [Jerry] Grover said the problem is that they've seen 
these before. They have to look at each lot discretely as to whether it can 
support agriculture. When limiting it to five acres, they have to have water 
on the lot to irrigate and maintain animals. 
Mr. [Jason] Ivins [representative of South Eagle L.C.] said this land is 
currently under a grazing lease with Smith's Livestock. They graze their 
animals across all 100 acres. After the agricultural division of land, they're 
still subject to that grazing lease. The lease provides that until they fence 
off the cattle, Smith's cattle have a right to be there. For the foreseeable 
future after this division of land, South Eagle still owns the land and 
Smith's Livestock runs it's cattle on each parcel that South Eagle owns. 
When they sell the land there will be a restriction on the deed that says the 
land is being sold subject to a grazing lease and until they fence out the 
cattle or the lease ends, they have the right to run the cattle. If someone 
bought the land and didn't fence it, the Assessor would still leave the land 
in Greenbelt because the cows would still be there. 
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[County] Commissioner [Jerry] Grover said they may or may not, they 
would have to establish that the cows are grazing on their piece of property. 
(R.at77). 
On December 3, 2002, the County Commission voted to continue South Eagle's 
Application to their December 10, 2002 meeting at the request of South Eagle. (R. at 81). 
On December 10, 2002, the County Commission voted to deny South Eagle's 
Application. During this meeting the following verbal exchange took place: 
[County] Commissioner [Jerry] Grover noted the recommendation from the 
Planning Commission was denial due to the lack of information on the 
water system. 
Jason Ivins [representative of South Eagle L.C.] reported South Eagle has 
250 acre feet of water although there is no distribution system as of yet. 
[County] Commissioner [Gary] Herbert asked if the new owners will have 
water rights, and if so, how will they get their water to their property. 
Tom Scribner, attorney for South Eagle, remarked everyone else trucks 
water in for their livestock and the new owners could as well. 
(R.at87). 
Also, during this meeting the County Commission made the following findings as 
outlined in Utah Code Annotated Section 17-27-806(2)(a): 
a) The parcels resulting from the proposed agricultural subdivision cannot be 
reasonably anticipated to qualify as uland in agricultural use," with the reasonable 
expectation of generating a profit, since the resulting parcels will be 
approximately 6-8 acres in size in an area where the primary agricultural use is dry 
land grazing of livestock on large tracts of land. 
b) The parcels are approximately 6-8 acres in size and the minimum lot size for 
subdivision purposes is 50 acres in the applicable zone, thereby preventing the 
8 
subsequent owners from having the ability to comply with the normal subdivision 
requirements if the proposed agricultural use of the parcels cannot be maintained, 
as required by Utah Code Annotated Section 17-27-806(e). 
c) The resulting parcels will not have any attached water rights, or other water rights, 
unless the buyers purchase water rights independently. 
d) The parcels have not historically been irrigated, and no irrigation water delivery 
systems are available. 
e) The developer does not have sufficient well irrigation water rights available for all 
parcel purchasers to acquire, to allow for the irrigation of the parcels. 
f) The current agricultural use of the property (large parcel dry land grazing) will not 
be facilitated by the proposed division of the property, but, in fact, will be 
interfered with since the small 6-8 acre parcels, with resulting fences and roads, 
will break up the large tract grazing use. 
g) The cost of water development will be prohibitive for profitable small five acre 
agricultural enterprises. 
h) Residential development is located at a great distance from the proposed parcels 
and the operators of any agricultural enterprise could not reasonable be expected to 
provide care for livestock operations with a reasonable expectation of generating a 
profit. 
i) Agricultural caretaker housing is not available within a reasonable proximity to the 
proposed parcels. 
j) The only reasonable use for the resulting parcels would be for investment or 
recreational uses. 
k) Economics of agricultural use of properties similar to the subject property (dry 
land livestock grazing) dictate that 6-8-acre parcels are not economically feasible, 
and other agricultural uses for the resulting parcels are also not economically 
feasible. 
1) The developer has failed to establish that the resulting parcels will continue, or 
have a reasonable expectation of continuing, in agricultural use. 
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m) The developer has failed to establish that the resulting parcels will continue, or 
have a reasonable expectation of continuing, to qualify for agricultural assessment 
under the provisions of the Farmland Assessment Act. 
n) Each of the above findings support the conclusion that the resulting parcels could 
not, within reason, be anticipated to qualify as "land in agricultural use", with the 
reasonable anticipation of generating a profit. 
o) Each of the above findings supports the conclusion that the resulting parcels will 
be used for non-agricultural purposes. Therefore the Board of County 
Commissioners can not make the required finding that the resulting parcels will 
not be used for non-agricultural purposes. 
(R. at 86-87). 
On December 24,2002, South Eagle hand delivered a Claim of Error to the 
County Commission. (R. at 106, 316). On January 22, 2003, South Eagle filed an 
Application for Alleged Error with the Secretary of the Utah County Board of 
Adjustment. (R. at 97-112). On January 24, 2003, South Eagle filed an Addendum to 
their Application for Alleged Error with the Secretary of the Utah County Board of 
Adjustment. (R. 113-117). 
On March 6,2003, the Board duly considered South Eagle's Application for 
Alleged Error and after hearing all of the evidence voted to deny the same, based on the 
following findings: 
a) That the applicant has appealed the decision of the Utah County Commission. 
b) That the applicant has not identified a specific finding or ruling of the Utah County 
Commission in which error was alleged. 
c) That based on the evidence and arguments presented to the Board, the Board has 
determined that the only relevant potential errors to be alleged would be errors in 
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the County Commission's findings relating to the compliance requirements with 
section 17-27-806(2) A-i, ii, iii UCA, and/or Section 3-53-B-I(b)i, ii, iii of the Utah 
County Zoning Ordinance. 
d) The County has stipulated that the South Eagle complied with the requirements of 
3-53-B-I-(b) regarding minimum lot requirements. 
e) The County did not present evidence regarding the requirement of Section 
3-53-B-I (b)iii regarding concerns that the property is not used and will not be used 
for any non-agricultural purpose. 
f) Considering the remaining element, that being Section 3-53-B-I (b)i, the applicant 
has the requirement to present evidence sufficient to persuade the Board of 
Adjustment that the County Commission errored [sic] in determining that the lot or 
parcel resulting from a division of agricultural land is exempt if the lot or parcel 
qualifies as land in agricultural use under Title 59, Chapter II, Part V, Farmland 
Assessment Act. 
g) The applicant has failed to provide sufficient evidence to convince the Board of 
Adjustment that the County Commission errored [sic] when it found in it's finding 
'Sub-paragraph N of paragraph 10/ that's contained in Utah County's response 
where it lists the findings and conclusions of the Utah County Commission, that 
each of the above findings support the conclusion that the resulting parcels could 
not, within reason, be anticipated to qualify as land in agricultural use, with a 
reasonable anticipation of generation of a profit. 
(R. at 330-331, 341 at 57-60). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This appeal is a review of the Board's decision upholding the decision of the 
County Commission who had denied South Eagle's Application for Agricultural Waiver 
of Subdivision Plat Filing Requirements pursuant to the requirements of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 17-27-806(2)(a) and Utah County Zoning Ordinance (hereinafter referred to as 
"UCZO") § 3-53-B-l. The Standard of review is that the "Board will be found to have 
11 
exercised its discretion within the proper boundaries unless its decision is arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal. Further, [t]he court shall affirm the decision of the board... if the 
decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record." Patterson v. Utah County 
Board of Adjustment, 893 P.2d at 604 (citations omitted). 
This appeal is only focused on whether each lot or parcel resulting from South 
Eagle's proposed division of agricultural land meets the requirements of UCZO § 3-53-B-
l(b)(i) and Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-806(2)(a)(i). Specifically, whether each lot or parcel 
resulting from South Eagle's proposed division of agricultural land "qualifies as land in 
agricultural use under Title 59, Chapter 2, Part 5, Farmland Assessment Act." 
The parties disagree as to what are the requirements for each lot or parcel resulting 
from a division of agricultural land to qualify as land in agricultural use under the 
Farmland Assessment Act. Appellees relied on Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-502(4) which 
requires that each lot parcel have a reasonable expectation of profit. South Eagle relied 
on Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-503 which does not have a reasonable expectation of profit 
requirement. {See Appellant's Brief, pages 20-22). 
However, even if both Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-502(4) and 59-2-503 apply, or if 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-503 applies to the exclusion of Utah Code Ann. 59-2-502(4), 
South Eagle has failed to show that each lot or parcel resulting from a division of 
agricultural land will have any agricultural use let alone any agricultural use with a 
reasonable expectation of a profit. 
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There is substantial evidence in record to demonstrate that each lot or parcel 
resulting from a division of agricultural land will not have any agricultural use let alone 
any agricultural use with a reasonable expectation of a profit. This substantial evidence 
consists of the following. The resulting lots or parcels will lack water and will not support 
dry farming. (R. at 73-74, 77, 87, 289-301). The resulting lots or parcels will be small in 
size. (R. at 86-87,289, 295-296). The resulting lots or parcels will be remotely located. 
(R. at 86-87). The resulting lots or parcels will not support grazing. (R. at 66). 
South Eagle's counter evidence of a Grazing Lease Agreement and restrictive 
covenants are irrelevant as to whether each lot or parcel resulting from a division of 
agricultural subdivision will have any agricultural use let alone any agricultural use with a 
reasonable expectation of a profit. South Eagle also argues that it's admissions should 
not be part of the record because they were not under oath or in violation of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. (See Appellant's Brief, page 13-14). However, South Eagle has 
waived it's objections to it's admissions. Also, the Utah Rules of Evidence does not 
apply to administrative proceedings and even if they did, then South Eagle's admissions 
are admissions by a party-opponent and are admissible. 
South Eagle's final contention is that the decision of the District Court to grant 
Summary Judgment for the Appellees should be reversed because the Appellees did not 
properly deny South Eagle's Statement of Facts. (See Appellant's Brief, pages 22-23). 
Any perceived mistakes the Appellees might have made in it's pleadings before the 
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District Court are wholly irrelevant to this Appeal because the Appellate Court reviews 
the Board's decision as if the appeal had come directly from the Board paying no homage 
to the decision of the District Court. See Patterson v. Utah County Board of Adjustment, 
893P.2dat603. 
Since South Eagle failed to establish that each lot or parcel resulting from a 
division in agricultural will have any agricultural use let alone any agricultural use with a 
reasonable expectation of a profit, then each lot or parcel does not qualify as 'land in 
agricultural use' under the Farmland Assessment Act. Therefore, the Appellate Court 
should affirm the Board's decision affirming the County Commission denying South 
Eagle's Application. 
ARGUMENT 
This appeal is a review of the Board's decision upholding the decision of the 
County Commission who had denied South Eagle's Application for Agricultural Waiver 
of Subdivision Plat Filing Requirements pursuant to the requirements of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 17-27-806(2)(a) and UCZO § 3-53-B-l. This appeal is a review of the record and is 
limited to such. See Patterson v. Utah County Board of Adjustment, 893 P.2d at 603. 
The underlying issue is whether the South Eagle's Application met the 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-806(2)(a) and UCZO § 3-53-B-l. In their 
Application, South Eagle sought a waiver of the normal subdivision plat filing 
requirements delineated in UCZO § 3-53-B by filing their Application under Exception 1: 
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agricultural land divided for agricultural purposes. This exception references and mostly 
mirrors the provision of state law dealing with divisions of agricultural land exempt from 
plat requirements, Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-806(2) which states as follows: 
(2) (a) Subject to Subsection (2)(b), a lot or parcel resulting from a division 
of agricultural land is exempt from the plat requirements of Section 
17-27-804 if the lot or parcel: 
(i) qualifies as land in agricultural use under Title 59, Chapter 2, Part 
5, Farmland Assessment Act; 
(ii) meets the minimum size requirement of applicable zoning ordinances; 
and 
(iii) is not used and will not be used for any nonagricultural purpose. 
(b) The boundaries of each lot or parcel exempted under Subsection (2)(a) 
shall be graphically illustrated on a record of survey map that, after 
receiving the same approvals as are required for a plat under Section 
17-27-805, shall be recorded with the county recorder. 
(c) If a lot or parcel exempted under Subsection (2)(a) is used for a 
nonagricultural purpose, the county in whose unincorporated area the lot or 
parcel is located may require the lot or parcel to comply with the 
requirements of Section 17-27-804. 
(emphasis added). The waiver of the normal subdivision plat filing requirements can only 
be approved if all of the requirements of UCZO § 3-53-B-l and Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-
806(2) are met. 
This appeal is further focused on whether each lot or parcel resulting from South 
Eagle's proposed division of agricultural land meets the requirements of UCZO § 3-53-B-
l(b)(i) and Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-806(2)(a)(i). Specifically, whether each lot or parcel 
resulting from South Eagle's proposed division of agricultural land "qualifies as land in 
agricultural use xmder Title 59, Chapter 2, Part 5, Farmland Assessment Act." Neither the 
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requirements of Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-27-806(2)(a)(ii)-(iii) nor UCZO §§ 3-53-B-
l(b)(ii)-(iii) are at issue on this appeal. 
I. THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW OF THIS APPEAL IS 
ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, OR ILLEGAL. 
In Patterson v. Utah County Board of Adjustment, 893 P.2d at 603, the Appellate 
Court stated that "[s]ince the district court's review of the Board's decision was limited to 
a review of the Board's record, we [Appellate Court] do not accord any particular 
deference to the district court's decision. Instead, we [Appellate Court] review the 
Board's decision as if the appeal had come directly from the agency." 
The Appellate Court has the same standard of review as the District Court has 
when reviewing the decision of a board of adjustment. See id. This standard of review is 
that the "Board will be found to have exercised its discretion within the proper boundaries 
unless its decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. Further, [t]he court shall affirm the 
decision of the board... if the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record." 
Id. at 604 (citations omitted). "Substantial evidence is that quantum and quality of 
relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion. 
It is more than a mere scintilla of evidence . . . though something less than the weight of 
the evidence." Id. at 604, n. 6 (citations omitted). 
In determining whether substantial evidence supports the Board's decision, the 
Appellate Court must consider all of the evidence in the record and may not accept or 
consider any evidence outside the record. Simply stated, the Appellate Court must 
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determine in light of the evidence before the Board of Adjustment, whether a reasonable 
mind could reach the same conclusion as the Board and must not weigh the evidence 
anew. See id. (citations omitted). 
On the other hand, whether or not the Board's decision is illegal depends on a 
proper interpretation and application of the law. The Appellate Court will "review a local 
agency's interpretation of ordinances for correctness, but also afford some level of 
non-binding deference to the interpretation advanced by the local agency." Carrier v. Salt 
Lake County, 2004 UT 98 at ^ 28. 
II. THE COUNTY COMMISSION PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE 
STATUTORY DEFINITION OF "LAND IN AGRICULTURAL USE" AS 
FOUND IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-2-502(4) WHICH REQUIRES A 
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PROFIT FOR EACH LOT OR 
PARCEL RESULTING FROM A DIVISION OF AGRICULTURAL LAND. 
Both UCZO § 3-53-B-l(b)(i) and Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-806(2)(a)(i) require 
that each lot or parcel resulting from a division of agricultural land "qualifies as land in 
agricultural use under Title 59, Chapter 2, Part 5, Farmland Assessment Act." South 
Eagle and Appellees differ as to what "qualifies as land in agricultural use under Title 59, 
Chapter 2, Part 5, Farmland Assessment Act." Appellees relied on Utah Code Ann. § 59-
2-502(4) for guidance. South Eagle relied on Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-503. 
At the outset, Appellees acknowledge that the standard of review for this issue is 
correctness, but the Appellate Court must "afford some level of non-binding deference to 
the interpretation advanced by the local agency." Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 
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98 at *P8. "In interpreting the meaning of a statute or ordinance" the court will "begin 
first by looking to the plain language of the ordinance" or statute. Id. at ^ [30; See also 
Biddle v. Wash. Terrance City, 1999 UT 110,1J14, 993 P.2d 875. 
A, Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-502(4) Defines the Phrase 'Land in Agricultural 
Use' and Should Be Considered. 
In determining whether each lot or parcel resulting from a division of agricultural 
land qualifies as land in agricultural use under Title 59, Chapter 2, Part 5, Farmland 
Assessment Act, the County Commission relied on the definition of 'land in agricultural 
use5 as found in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-502(4). 'Land in agricultural use' is a specific 
phrase and is clearly defined within the Farmland Assessment Act. Utah Code Ann. § 
59-2-502(4) defines 'land in agricultural use' as follows: 
(a) land devoted to the raising of useful plants and animals with a reasonable 
expectation of profit, including: 
(i) forages and sod crops; 
(ii) grains and feed crops; 
(iii) livestock as defined in Section 59-2-102; 
(iv) trees and fruits; or 
(v) vegetables, nursery, floral, and ornamental stock; or 
(b) land devoted to and meeting the requirements and qualifications for payments 
or other compensation under a crop-land retirement program with an agency of the 
state or federal government. 
(emphasis added). The definition of 'land in agricultural use' is significant because it 
imposes a reasonable expectation of profit requirement. Thus, reading Utah Code Ann. § 
59-2-502(4) in conjunction with of Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-806(2)(a) and Utah County 
Zoning Ordinance § 3-53-B-I require that each lot or parcel resulting from a division of 
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agricultural land must qualify as land in agricultural use with a reasonable expectation of 
profit. 
B. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-503 Entitled "Qualifications for Agricultural 
Use Assessment" Is Not Relevant and Only Applies to Assessment for 
General Property Tax Purposes. 
In contrast, the South Eagle argues that Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-503, entitled 
"Qualifications for Agricultural Use Assessment," should establish the standard for what 
land qualifies as 'land in agricultural use.' (See Appellant's Brief, pages 20-22). Although 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-503 is within the Farmland Assessment Act, it has little or no 
bearing on whether each lot or parcel resulting from a division of agricultural land 
qualified as land in agricultural use. The plain reading of that statute demonstrates that 
the statute only applies to assessment for general property tax purposes. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-2-503(1). 
The better reading of Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-806(2)(a) and UCZO § 3-53-B-l, 
which require that each lot or parcel resulting from a division of agricultural land 
qualifies as land in agricultural use under Title 59, Chapter 2, Part 5, Farmland 
Assessment Act, is to focus on the definition of the phrase 'land in agriculture use' as 
found in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-502(4) rather than to rely on a section of the Farmland 
Assessment Act which is focused on assessment for general property tax purposes. 
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C. South Eagle Has Failed to Show That Each Lot or Parcel Resulting 
from a Division of Agricultural Land Will Have Any Agricultural Use 
Let Alone Any Agricultural Use with a Reasonable Expectation of a 
Profit. 
However, even if both Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-502(4) and 59-2-503 apply, or if 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-503 applies to the exclusion of Utah Code Ann. 59-2-502(4), then 
the Appellate should still affirm the decision of the Board affirming the County 
Commission's decision denying South Eagle's Application because they have failed to 
show that each lot or parcel resulting from a division of agricultural land will have any 
agricultural use let alone any agricultural use with a reasonable expectation of a profit for 
the reasons state in Section III of Appellees' Brief below. 
III. THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT 
THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT WHO AFFIRMED 
THE DECISION OF THE COUNTY COMMISSION DENYING SOUTH 
EAGLE'S APPLICATION FOR AGRICULTURAL WAIVER OF 
SUBDIVISION PLAT FILING REQUIREMENTS. 
At the outset, it is important to point out that from the beginning that it was and 
still is South Eagle's burden of proof to show that the Application met all of the 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-806(2)(a) and UCZO § 3-53-B-l. South Eagle 
had the burden of proof before the Planning Commission and County Commission. On 
appeal to the Board of Adjustment, South Eagle had the burden to show that County 
Commission erred in denying South Eagle's Application. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-
704(2) and UCZO § 7-19-B-8. On appeal to the District Court, South Eagle had the 
burden to show that the decision of the Board of Adjustment was not supported by 
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substantial evidence was therefore arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. See Utah Code Ann. § 
17-27-708(6). On this appeal, South Eagle still has the burden to show that the decision 
of the Board of Adjustment was not supported by substantial evidence was therefore 
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-708(6). At no time, did 
Appellees have the burden of proof or any obligation to present evidence either for or 
against South Eagle's Application. 
South Eagle also had before the District Court and still has before the Appellate 
Court, the additional burden "to marshal all of the evidence in support thereof and show 
that despite the supporting facts, and in light of conflicting or contradictory evidence, the 
findings and decision are not supported by substantial evidence." Patterson v. Utah 
County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d at 604, n. 7 (citation omitted). 
A. Substantial Evidence in the Record Supporting the Decision of the 
Board of Adjustment. 
There is substantial evidence in record to support the decision of the Board who 
affirmed the decision of the County Commission denying South Eagle's Application. 
Specifically, there is substantial evidence in record to demonstrate that each lot or parcel 
resulting from a division of agricultural land will not have any agricultural use let alone 
any agricultural use with a reasonable expectation of a profit. This substantial evidence 
consists of the following. 
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L Resulting lots or parcels will lack water and will not support dry 
farming. 
First, each lot or parcel resulting from the division of agricultural land will not 
have water associated with them. South Eagle's Application is devoid of any references 
to water associated with each lot or parcel resulting from the division of agricultural land. 
(R. at 289-301). South confirms the lack of water in it's Record of Survey Map attached 
to the Application which contains the following disclaimer that "a 5 acre lot in a non-
irrigated area, such as the subject land, may not qualify for the value of agricultural 
production established by state law to obtain greenbelt designation under the Farmland 
Assessment Act." (R. at 289, 295-296) (emphasis added). 
During the November 19,2002, Planning Commission Meeting, Dean Miner 
[Planning Commissioner] stated that he "felt that because of the lack of water to this 
parcel, the farming expectation was highly unreasonable, noting that the area is 
historically dry." (R. at 73-74). During the November 26, 2002, County Meeting, County 
Commissioner Gary Herbert said "he would want to see evidence of water and the ability 
to have water to each of the lots in order to justify the agricultural purpose." (R. at 77). 
Also, County Commissioner Jerry Grover said "the implication is that each lot has got to 
have water rights associated with it. A dry farm can't exist on five-acre lots." (R. at 77). 
Furthermore, during the December 10,2002 County Commission Meeting, South 
Eagles confirmed that dry farming would not work when Jason Ivins [representative of 
South Eagle] said "Greenbelt has a low threshold and dry farming wouldn't work, but 
22 
mere grazing would." (R. at 77). Also, during the December 10,2002 County 
Commission Meeting the following exchange took place confirming the lack of water: 
[County] Commissioner [Jerry] Grover noted the recommendation from the 
Planning Commission was denial due to the lack of information on the 
water system. 
Jason Ivins [representative of South Eagle L.C.] reported South Eagle has 
250 acre feet of water although there is no distribution system as of yet. 
[County] Commissioner [Gary] Herbert asked if the new owners will have 
water rights, and if so, how will they get their water to their property. 
Tom Scribner, attorney for South Eagle, remarked everyone else trucks 
water in for their livestock and the new owners could as well. 
(R.at81). 
There is ample evidence in the record to demonstrate that each lot or parcel 
resulting from the division of agricultural land lacks water and can not be irrigated. Any 
need for water will require that the water be trucked in. There is also ample evidence in 
the record that each lot or parcel resulting from the division of agricultural land will not 
support dry farming. 
ii. Resulting lots or parcels will be small in size. 
Second, each lot or parcel resulting from the division of agricultural land will be 
between five and eight acres in size. (R. at 289,295-296). The resulting lots or parcels 
will be further separated by fences and roads. Between five and eight acres in size is 
relatively small lots for that zone and for any resulting agricultural operation. Typically, 
the minimum lot size for this particular zone was 50 acres. (R. at 87). The County 
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Commission specifically held that the "[economics of agricultural use of properties 
similar to the subject property (dry land livestock grazing) dictate that 6-8 parcels are not 
economically feasible and other agricultural uses for the resulting parcels are also not 
economically feasible." (R. at 86). 
in. Resulting lots or parcels will be remotely located. 
Third, the property at issue is relatively remote. (R. at 86). South Eagle suggests 
that "everyone else trucks water in for their livestock and the new owners could as well." 
(R. at 87). The requirement to truck in water is unreasonable especially considering the 
remoteness of the property. The County Commission specifically held that the 
"[residential development is located at a great distance from the proposed parcels and the 
operators of any agricultural enterprise could not reasonable be expected to provide care 
for livestock operations with a reasonable expectations of generating a profit." (R. at 86). 
iv. Resulting lots or parcels will not support grazing. 
As indicated above, South Eagle has admitted that resulting lots or parcels will not 
have water. (R. at 87,289,295-296). South Eagle has also admitted that "dry farming 
would not work." (R. at 77). 
Most importantly, South Eagle has admitted that grazing would not work on each 
lot or parcel resulting from a division of agricultural land in the following verbal 
exchange from the October 15,2002 Planning Commission Meeting: 
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Dave Shawcroft [Deputy County Attorney] questioned whether the property 
qualifies as an agricultural subdivision. He felt the use was unclear for the 
foreseeable future. 
Bill Ferguson [Planning Commissioner] noted that the applicant would not 
qualify for grazing on a 5-acre lot. 
Jason Ivins [representative of South Eagle] stated that Barbara Gordon 
[Utah County Assessor's Office] said the land is currently in a classification 
four. Grazing four requires 1.1 cow for 2 months out of the year of five 
acres to keep the land in greenbelt. 
Bill Ferguson [Planning Commissioner] claimed the land would not support 
that right now. 
Jason Ivins [representative of South Eagle] stated it may not right now but 
that is why the greenbelt doesn't require it. 
(R. at 66) (emphasis added). 
In the above verbal exchange, South Eagle has admitted that each lot or parcel 
resulting from a division of agricultural land can not support 1.1 cow for 2 months out of 
the year. In essence, this means that each lot or parcel resulting from a division of 
agricultural land can not support grazing. That admission is amply supported since there 
is no water, the resulting lots or parcels are relatively small, the resulting lots or parcels 
are relatively remote. 
Therefore, each lot or parcel resulting from a division of agricultural land will not 
support irrigated farming, dry farming, or grazing and will not have any agricultural use 
let alone any agricultural use with a reasonable expectation of a profit. Rather, each lot or 
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parcel resulting from a division of agricultural land will be used merely for investment or 
recreational uses. 
B. Counter Evidence Offered by South Eagle is Irrelevant 
South Eagle counters that the historical agricultural use of the property (large 
parcel dry land grazing) will continue. (See Appellant's Brief, pages 14,16,18,21-22). 
South Eagle argues that this will be insured by a Grazing Lease Agreement (hereinafter 
referred to as "Lease") and restrictive covenants. (See Appellant's Brief, pages 14,18, 
19,21). 
i. Grazing lease agreement 
The Lease purports to cover the entire proposed agricultural subdivision. (R. at 
90-92). This Lease is clearly irrelevant because Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-806(2) 
specifically requires that each parcel or lot qualify on their own accord as land in 
agricultural use under the Farmland Assessment Act. As a result, each lot or parcel 
resulting from a division of agricultural land must have its own agricultural use and such 
use must have a reasonable expectation of a profit. This Lease merely gives the lessee the 
right to graze livestock on the resulting lots or parcel parcels in the proposed agricultural 
subdivision until such time as fences are erected. (R. at 91-92). This Lease is nothing 
more than a fence-out provision to protect the lessee from trespass claims from the 
resulting lot or parcel owners. The Lease does nothing to establish that each lot or parcel 
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resulting from a division of agricultural land will have an agricultural use let alone any 
agricultural use with a reasonable expectation of a profit. 
ii. Restrictive covenants. 
South Eagle also offers as evidence that each lot or parcel resulting from a division 
of agricultural land will be covered by restrictive covenants limiting their use to 
agricultural uses. (R. at 297-299). UCZO § 3-53-B-l(b)(iii) requires that "the owners 
have recorded satisfactory deed covenants which preclude the present and future 
residential or other non-agricultural use of the parcel to be divided until the recording of a 
properly approved subdivision plat." The restrictive covenants offered by South Eagle 
satisfy the requirements of UCZO § 3-53-B-l(b)(iii), but do not satisfy the requirements 
of UCZO § 3-53-B-l(b)(i) and do nothing to establish that each lot or parcel resulting 
from a division of agricultural land will have an agricultural use let alone any agricultural 
use with a reasonable expectation of a profit. 
iii. Allegation that the County did not present evidence regarding 
the requirement of UCZO §3-53-B-l(b)(iii). 
South Eagle also argues that finding by that Board that "the County did not present 
evidence regarding the requirement of [UCZO] §3-53-B-l(b)(ii) [sic] regarding concerns 
that property is not used and will not be used for any non-agricultural purpose," demands 
immediate reversal. (See Appellant's Brief, page 19). This argument is immaterial for 
two reasons. 
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First, as stated before South Eagle had the burden of proof and Appellees had no 
obligation present any evidence. Second, and most importantly, this appeal is only 
focused on whether each lot or parcel resulting from South Eagle's proposed division of 
agricultural land meets the requirements of UCZO § 3-53-B-l(b)(i) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 17-27-806(2)(a)(i). Specifically, whether each lot or parcel resulting from South 
Eagle's proposed division of agricultural land "qualifies as land in agricultural use under 
Title 59, Chapter 2, Part 5, Farmland Assessment Act." Neither the requirements of Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 17-27-806(2)(a)(ii)-(iii) nor UCZO §§ 3-53-B-l(b)(ii)-(iii) are at issue on 
this appeal. Therefore, the Board's finding as to UCZO §3-53-B-l(b)(iii) has no bearing 
on whether South Eagle met the requirements of UCZO § 3-53-B-l(b)(i) and Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-27-806(2)(a)(i). 
As stated previously, the Appellate Court must now weigh the evidence anew, but 
must simply determine in the light of the evidence before the Board, whether a reasonable 
mind could reach the same conclusion of the Board. See Patterson v. Utah County Board 
of Adjustment, 893 P.2d at 604. Considering the above evidence, it is clear that there is 
substantial evidence to determine that the resulting lots or parcels can not support 
irrigated fanning, dry farming, or grazing and therefore will not have any agricultural use 
let alone any agricultural use with a reasonable expectation of a profit. Without any 
agricultural use let alone any agricultural use with a reasonable expectation of a profit, 
then each lot or parcel can not qualify as land in agricultural use under Title 59, Chapter 
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2, Part 5, Farmland Assessment Act, pursuant to UCZO § 3-53-B-l(b)(i) and Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-27-806(2)(a)(i) and the Appellate Court should affirm the decision of the 
Board. 
IV. SOUTH EAGLE'S ADMISSIONS ARE PROPERLY PART OF THE 
RECORD AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. 
South Eagle next argues that it's admissions should not be part of the record. (See 
Appellant's Brief, pages 13-14). It is important to point out that South Eagle does not 
argue the substance of it's admissions. Rather, South Eagle argues that it's admissions 
should be excluded because they were not under oath or in violation of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. South Eagle also seems to focus on statements of staff or members of the 
Planning Commission, when the real focus should be on South Eagle's admissions 
because they were part of the evidence duly considered by the County Commission and 
the Board. The statements by staff and members of the Planning Commission are added 
merely to put South Eagle's admissions in context. 
In this regard, South Eagle has waived it's objections to it's admissions. Even if 
South Eagle has not waived it's objections, the Utah Rules of Evidence does not apply to 
administrative proceedings. Further, even if the Utah Rules of Evidence does apply, then 
South Eagle's admissions are admissions by a party-opponent and are admissible. 
A. South Eagle Has Waived It's Objections to It's Admissions. 
First, South Eagle has waived it's objections to it's admissions or any other 
statements. South Eagle did briefly raises it's objections in Petitioner's Response to Utah 
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County's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment before the District Court, but South Eagle 
did not raise any objections prior to that. (R. at 407-408). "Questions not raised in an 
administrative tribunal are generally not subject to judicial review." Board of 
Equalization of Summit County v. State Tax Comm 'n, 2004 UT App 283, ^  6, 98 P.3d 
782, 784 (citing Jensen v. State Tax Comm'n, 835 P.2d 965, 974 (Utah 1992)). 
There is no evidence that South Eagle raised it's objections to the admissions and 
other statements when these statements were made before the Planning Commission and 
County Commission. (R. at 66, 77, 87). There is also no evidence that South Eagle 
raised it's objections to the admissions and other statements when this matter was on 
review to the Board, even though the admissions and other statements were part of the 
record before the Board. (R. at 97-112,113-117,165-172, 341). Finally, there is no 
evidence that South Eagle raised it's objections to the admissions and other statements 
when the Record of Proceedings was filed with the district court. 
South Eagle should have objected to the admissions and other statements when 
made, and continued to object at all stages of the proceedings. Therefore, South Eagle 
has waived it's objections to it's admissions and other statements. 
B. The Utah Rules of Evidence Do Not Apply to Administrative Hearings. 
Second, the Utah Rules of Evidence do not apply in a strict sense to administrative 
hearings. Pursuant to Rule 101 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the rules of evidence 
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"govern proceedings in the courts of this State, to the extend and with the exceptions 
stated in Rule 1101." 
In Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 29 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991)(citations omitted), the Appellate Court held that "[t]he strict rules of evidence and 
procedure that apply in a courtroom, however, need not apply in an administrative 
hearing. Hearsay and other forms of evidence that might be inadmissible in a court of law 
may be considered during an administrative hearing." The Appellate Court further held 
that: "[t]he fact that administrative agencies may not be bound by formal rules of 
evidence and procedure, does not mean that they are above the law. In the absence of 
formal legal rules, an administrative body must still determine what evidence should, in 
'fairness/ be admitted. The evidence must have 'some probative weight and reliability.'" 
Id. at 31 (citing Bunnell v. Industrial Comm % 740 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 1987)). 
To require administrative or adjudicative boards to be encumbered by the strict 
rules of evidence would be a great burden upon not only the respective administrative 
agency, but upon the general public as well. These administrative hearings are not courts 
of law and do not fall under the same rules and procedures. 
C. South Eagle's Statements Are Admissions by a Party-opponent 
Third, even if the Utah Rules of Evidence apply, then South Eagle's admissions 
are still admissible. Rule 801(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides statements 
which are not hearsay and include those "offered against a party and is . . . the party's 
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own statement, in either an individual or representative capacity." The admissions that 
each lot or parcel resulting from a division of agricultural land can not support irrigated 
farming, dry farming, or grazing were made by South Eagle's representative and are 
therefore admissions by a party opponent. Therefore, South Eagle's admissions should be 
considered as part of the record. 
V, THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT ARE 
IRRELEVANT TO THIS APPEAL AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED. 
As stated in Patterson v. Utah County Board of Adjustment, 893 P.2d at 603 
"[s]ince the district court's review of the Board's decision was limited to a review of the 
Board's record, we [Appellate Court] do not accord any particular deference to the district 
court's decision. Instead, we [Appellate Court] review the Board's decision as if the 
appeal had come directly from the agency." This suggests that the proceedings before the 
District Court are irrelevant and should not be considered. 
South Eagle argues that the decision of the District Court to grant Summary 
Judgment for the Appellees should be reversed because the Appellees "failed to set forth 
separately numbered facts supported by citation to affidavits and other materials as 
required by Rule 7 [of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure]. Instead, [South Eagle] has 
alternately admitted or denied the facts as though preparing an answer to a complaint 
without citing to the record." {See Appellant's Brief, page 23). 
However, South Eagle fails to point out that Appellees objected to South Eagle's 
Statement of Uncontested Facts for failure to cite to the Record of Proceedings. (R. at 
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399-398). Appellees' response was only after an objection was made. Finally, as stated 
above, any perceived mistakes the Appellees may have made in it's pleadings before the 
District Court are wholly irrelevant to this Appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellees request that requests that the Appellate Court 
affirm the decision of the Board who affirmed the decision of the County Commission 
denying South Eagle's Application for Agricultural Waiver of Subdivision Plat Filing 
Requirements. 
DATED this LL day of j A ^ ^ f . 2005. 
ROBERT J. MpORE 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
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AN ORDINANCE AMENDING THE UTAH COUNTY ZONINcf* 
ORDINANCE, AS TO SECTION 3-53-B [DIVISION OF LAND, PLAT 
REQUIRED - EXCEPTION^ AND SECTION 7-27 [VIOLATIONS] 
THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF UTAH 
ORDAINS AS FOLLOWS: 
PART I: 
Section 3-53-B of the Utah County Zoning Ordinance is hereby amended to read as follows: 
EXEMPTIONS 
1. Exception 1 — agricultural land divided for agricultural purposes. 
a. If a landowner or agent of any owner of real property seeks to partition a 
parcel of land without recording a plat, by virtue of the exemption in zoning 
section 2-2-B-136-C of the Utah County Zoning Ordinance and section 17-
27-806(2JTJtah Code Annotated 1953 or its successor statute, related to the 
division of agricultural land for agricultural purposes, such person shall first 
obtain a waiver on forms furnished and signed by the Zoning Administrator 
prior to recording the deeds or other instruments of transfer which divide the 
land. Such deeds or other instruments of transfer shall, before they are 
recorded, have the signature of approval by the zoning administrator and a 
reference to the waiver document. 
b.. The Zoning Administrator shall approve the waiver only li ie or she finds: 
(i) the parcel of land qualifies as "land in agricultu ' use" under Title 
59, Chapter 2, Part 5, Farmland Assessment of Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 or its successor statute; 
(ii) the current land uses present on the property are listed uses in the 
subject zoning district and the parcels resulting from the division 
meet the minimum lot width and area requirements of such district; 
(iii) the owners have recorded satisfactory deed covenants which 
preclude the present and future residential or other non-agricultural 
use of the parcel to be divided until the recording of a properly 
approved subdivision plat; 
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(iv) the applicants have satisfactorily completed a standard waiver 
application 
c. For a parcel with mixed use, where a portion of the parcel to be divided is 
residential land (or a land use other than for agriculture as such is delineated 
in Title 15, Chapter 2, Part 5 Utah Code Annotated) and the balance is 
agricultural land, the agricultural portion may be divided off from the other 
land only if: 
(i) no additional parcels of land for residential or non-agricultural use 
are created (e.g. if the zoning ordinance allows one site for 
residential use on the parcel before it is divided, no more than one 
such site may exist after the land is divided; or if no residential site 
exists before the division, none may exist after the waiver is issued); 
(ii) all residential parcels and other parcels resulting from the waiver and 
division must meet the current minimum area, width, public street 
frontage, set back and other standards of the zone; 
(iii) the agricultural parcels resulting from the division shall be covered 
by recorded satisfactory deed covenants which preclude the present 
and future residential or other non-agricultural use of the land until 
the recording of a properly approved subdivision plat; 
(iv) the "record of survey map " which is a component of the waiver 
application and a requirement of sectionl 7-27-806(2)(b) Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 shall designate which parcels are for residential or 
other non-agricultural uses and which are agricultural uses covered 
by the protective covenant 
d. No lot or parcel which has been issued a waiver and divided according to 
this part shall be used for residential or other non-agricultural purposes until 
a subdivision plat which includes the parcel has been approved and recorded 
with the county recorder. 
2. Exception 2 - approved divisions into fewer than 10 lots 
a. If a landowner or agent of any owner of real property seeks to partition land 
without recording a plat by virtue of the exemption for qualifying divisions 
of land into fewer than 10 lots, such person shall first obtain an approval of 
a waiver on forms furnished and signed by the Zoning Administrator prior 
to. the recording of deeds or other instruments of transfer which divide the 
land. Such deeds or other instruments of transfer shall, before they are 
recorded, have the signature of approval by the zoning administrator and a 
reference to the waiver document. 
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b. The Zoning Administrator shall approve the waiver only if he or she finds: 
(i) that the total number of parcels or splinters of land resulting from 
divisions from the initial parcel shall be fewer than 10; this shall not 
allow a series of land divisions occurring at different periods of time 
to result in a total of 10 or more parcels; and this requirement shall 
be interpreted to run with the land, not the owners, so that 
subsequent owners shall not each be entitled to make a division into 
fewer than 10 lots without recording an approved subdivision plat; 
(ii) each of the parcels resulting from the division shall abut on a public 
street which has been platted and dedicated in fee to Utah County; 
furthermore, no street dedications, dedications of public easements, 
parks, floodways or other public places shall be necessary because 
such already exist for each of the parcels resulting from the division; 
(in) each of the parcels resulting from the divisions shall meet the current 
minimum area, width, public street frontage, set back and other 
standards of the zone; 
(iv) the land within the boundaries of the parcels resulting from the 
divisions shall not be traversed by a the mapped lines of a proposed 
street shown on the general plan. 
3. Any sale or other transfer of land into two or more parcels without either obtaining 
a signed waiver from the Zoning Administrator, or recording an approved 
subdivision plat with the county recorder shall be prima facie evidence of the illegal 
subdivision of land and a violation of this ordinance, subject to the penalties stated 
herein. 
PART II: 
Section 7-27 of the Utah County Zoning Ordinance is hereby amended to add a new subsection C, 
which shall read as follows: 
The owner or agent of an owner who records a subdivision plat that has not been approved 
under the terms of Chapter 6 of this Utah County Zoning Ordinance, or who transfers land 
that has been divided into two or more parcels without being included in an approved, 
recorded subdivision plat, or granted a waiver under section 3-53-B of this ordinance, shall 
be in violation of this ordinance for each such lot which has been transferred or sold. 
Besides the other remedies listed in section 7-28, the parties seeking remedies thereunder 
may involve the property owners involved, including both past and present owners of the 
divided land, to obtain an injunction, abatement, or merger of title to remedy the improper 
division. 
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PART Hit 
Insert pages reflecting the above amendments are hereby ordered to be filed in the three file 
copies of the Official Utah County Zone Map on file with the Utah County Auditor/Clerk. 
PART IV: 
This ordinance shall take effect: 1. sixteen (16) days after it is passed, or 2. after is has been 
published, whichever date is later. 
PASSED and ordered published this 22n4lay of A u 9 u s t 
_, 2000. 




Gary R. Herbert, Commissioner 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 




.[one time, as soon as possible] 
